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Ask Not What Your Government Can Do for You,  
Ask What Your Government Can Do for Small 
Business:
A Proposal for Government Involvement in the 
Securitization of Conventional Small Business Loans 
Eduardo F. Rodríguez1
America's small businesses—some twenty million strong—are the 
strength of our nation's economy. They account for thirty-nine percent 
of the country's gross national product, create two out of every three 
new jobs and produce two and one half times as many innovations per 
employee as do large firms.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses are responsible for the creation of most new jobs, 
particularly in a struggling economy.  During political campaigns, politi-
cians tout their records on creating jobs and implementing programs that 
support small business.  Government has historically been able to help 
small businesses by creating programs that finance small businesses and 
ensuring government contracts for small businesses.  The Small Business 
Administration [SBA] is viewed as the Government’s greatest example of 
its support for small business.  While the SBA has created many excellent 
programs that help finance small businesses and educate small business 
owners about the management, financing, and expansion of their busi-
nesses, there is still more that the Government can do to support small busi-
ness.  For example, the creation of a successful and efficient secondary 
market for conventional small business loans can provide new and exciting 
opportunities for financing small businesses.  Like with other forms of se-
curitization, the Government is best-equipped to support such an initiative 
thanks to their impeccable credit ratings and past experiences with securiti-
zation. 
Small business owners look to many different sources for financing 
the start-up, ongoing, and growth related costs of their business.  There are 
two basic forms of financing—equity and debt.  Typically, new small busi-
nesses rely on equity financing in the form of savings or personal loans.  
Financing through small business loans is, at times, hard to come by for 
entrepreneurs.  SBA programs have served small businesses for over fifty 
years and provide excellent opportunities for small business owners.  Con-
ventional small business loans that are originated by commercial and com-
munity banks alike are typically reserved for those small businesses that are 
well established and enjoy excellent credit histories.    
Minority-owned small businesses are less likely to secure financing 
through these conventional small business loans than non-minority-owned 
2007] Ask Not What Your Government Can Do For You . . .  145
small businesses.3  While disproportionate access to small business credit is 
partly a function of industry trends and the greater risk that is involved in 
lending to minorities, statistical studies have shown that after controlling 
for factors such as creditworthiness, wealth, education, and others, minori-
ties are discriminated against when banks issue small business loans.4  The 
beginnings of improving access to small business capital for minority busi-
ness owners may lie in improving the secondary markets for conventional 
small business loans.  Given the importance of small businesses, and in 
particular minority small businesses,5 to the future prosperity of the United 
States economy, it is time the Federal Government installed programs simi-
lar to those in the residential and commercial mortgage secondary markets 
in the arena of small business loans. 
This comment will propose what is needed in order to successfully and 
efficiently securitize conventional small business loans.  Drawing on the 
experience of the mortgage secondary markets, this comment will make 
several recommendations as to the level of government involvement needed 
in order to effectuate an efficient secondary market for small business 
loans.  Moreover, this comment will make recommendations to improve the 
overall lending environment that will make small business loans more mar-
ketable to investors in asset-backed securities. 
3
 The Minority Business Development Agency provides several reasons for such a discrepancy.  
Ronald Langston, Report of the Summit on Minority Business Financing, Accelerating Job Creation and 
Economic Productivity: Expanding Financing Opportunities for Minority Businesses, U.S. Department 
of Commerce Minority Business Development Agency, 11 (2004), available at
http://www.mbda.gov/documents/Report_Cover.pdf.   Some of these reasons are firm specific, such as 
equity capitalization, creditworthiness, owner education, and race.  Id. Other reasons are industry spe-
cific and include lack of performance information, bank consolidation, and financial innovation (credit 
scoring).  Id.
4
 See David G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small Business Credit Market, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, 3 (Dec.1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6840 (showing that when applying for small business loans, black-owned 
firms are statistically discriminated against when compared to white-owned firms); see also Ken Caval-
luzzo & John Wolken, Small Business Loan Turndowns, Personal Wealth and Discrimination, 5 (July 
2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200235/200235pap.pdf (showing that 
differences in personal wealth do little to explain why minority-owned firms are denied credit at a 
higher rate than white-owned firms and that discrimination is a prevalent reason for loan denial); see 
also Ken Cavalluzo et al., Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence From 
a New Survey, 23 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/ 
1999/199925/199925pap.pdf (showing that minority-owned firms are discriminated against more heav-
ily in markets where there is less bank competition). 
5
 Minorities are expected to represent ninety percent of population growth until 2050.  U.S. 
Department of Commerce Minority Business Development Agency & U.S. Census Bureau, Dynamic 
Diversity: Projected Changes in U.S. Race and Ethnic Composition 1995 to 2050, 5, (Dec. 1999),  
available at http://www.mbda.gov/documents/unpubtext.pdf. More importantly, minority-owned firms 
account for fifty six percent of workforce growth and are expected to account for between sixty four and 
seventy percent in the next twenty years.  Milken Institute & U.S. Department of Commerce Minority 
Business Development Agency, The Minority Business Challenge: Democratizing Capital for Emerging 
Domestic Markets, 5 (Sept. 25, 2000), available at http://www.mbda.gov /documents/democratizing.pdf. 
77
146 FIU Law Review [2:143
The next section will provide background information as to the origins 
and mechanics of securitization.  Section III will recommend several 
changes that will improve the secondary market for small business loans.  
Finally, section IV will conclude. 
II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss (A) the history of securitization, (B) the intri-
cacies of a securitization transaction, and (C) why firms securitize their 
assets. 
A. The History of Securitization 
The success of securitization has been primarily driven by the United 
States Federal Government.6  In encouraging home ownership, Congress 
created government-owned and government-sponsored entities to create a 
secondary market for residential mortgages.7  The first of these entities is 
the Federal National Mortgage Association, which was created in 1938 to 
purchase federally-insured home mortgages.8  The Federal National Mort-
gage Association became known as Fannie Mae.  In 1968, Fannie Mae was 
split into two separate entities, the first of which retained the name Fannie 
Mae and was a privately-owned government-sponsored entity.9  The second 
entity is the Government National Mortgage Association, better known as 
Ginnie Mae, and is a government-owned entity.10  Both Fannie Mae and 
Ginnie Mae were created to purchase and sell federally-insured mortgages.  
Finally, in 1971, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration or Freddie Mac in order to improve the secondary market for con-
ventional home mortgages.11  Like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac is a privately-
owned government-sponsored entity.  While creating Freddie Mac, Con-
gress also augmented the authority of Fannie Mae enabling it to purchase 
conventional and variable-rate loans.12
6
 Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and 
New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1991); Stephen J. Cosentino, Swimming in New Waters—
Bank Participation in Securitized Loan Pools, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 543, 544 (1997); Amy C. Bushaw, 
Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the Waters, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 197, 216-17 (1998). 
7
 Peter F. Culver, The Dawning of Securitization, 8-APR PROB. & PROP. 34, 36 (1994); The 
Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 537 (1995) (hereinafter “Structured 
Financing Techniques”); Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217. 
8
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1384. 
9
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217. 
10
 Id.
11
 In response to a near crisis in the housing industry, Congress passed the Emergency Home 
Finance Act of 1970 creating Freddie Mac.  Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1384.  Freddie Mac 
was created for the purpose of improving the secondary market in conventional residential mortgages.  
Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217.    
12
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1384. 
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In 1970, Ginnie Mae issued the first securities backed by pools of 
home mortgages.13  The securities issued by Ginnie Mae were backed by 
pools of FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed residential mortgages.14  Investors 
in these securities purchased pass-through certificates entitling them to the 
borrowers’ principal and interest payments as they came due.15  Ginnie Mae 
served as the guarantor of full and timely payment of principal and inter-
est.16
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac soon issued securities of their own.17
Unlike Ginnie Mae’s securities, these securities did not carry with them an 
explicit government guarantee.18  However, participants in the market for 
these securities regarded these securities as if though they carried an im-
plicit government guarantee.19
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac are still responsible for 
most mortgage securitization transactions today.20  By 1994, over $1 trillion 
in mortgage backed securities were outstanding.21  Mortgages are the most 
widely securitized financial assets.22
In the 1980s, more complex payment structures began to emerge creat-
ing a wider investment market for mortgage-backed securities.23  Beginning 
in 1983, Freddie Mac issued Collateralized Mortgage Obligations known as 
CMOs.24  These CMOs altered the traditional pay-through structure of 
mortgage-backed securities by creating tranches with different payment 
structures in order to meet the needs of different investors.25  The Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 allowed for pass-through tax treatment for entities issuing 
multiple classes or tranches of securities by creating Real Estate Mortgage 
Investment Conduits, or REMICs.26  These REMICs allowed for entities 
issuing securities similar to CMOs to not be taxed at the entity level.27  Be-
cause loan originators soon began originating loans fashioned for securiti-
13
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 537. 
14
 Id.
15
 Culver, supra note 7, at 36. 
16
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 537; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 
1384. 
17
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217. 
18
 Id. at 218. 
19
 Id.
20
 Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1076
(1996). 
21
 Id.; Culver, supra note 7, at 36; Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real 
Estate Law and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 271 (1999) (showing exponential growth of 
mortgage securitizations between 1984 and 1998). 
22
 Culver, supra note 7, at 36. 
23
 Id.
24
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 537. 
25
 Id.
26
 Id.
27
 Id. at 537-38. 
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zation, uniform legal documentation and underwriting standards for con-
ventional residential mortgages were introduced by the federal agencies that 
participated in securitization.28  This improved the prospects of securitiza-
tion since it was now easier to predict payment patterns and the overall 
credit risk of the mortgages being securitized. 
The private sector entered the secondary mortgage market when Cali-
fornia Federal Savings and Loan issued the first publicly rated mortgage-
backed security in 1975.29  In 1977, Bank of America issued the first pub-
licly rated security backed by conventional mortgages.30  Eventually, mort-
gage bankers, home builders, investment banks, and insurance companies 
began issuing mortgage backed securities of their own.31
Gaining from the experiences of the secondary mortgage market, other 
types of financial assets were soon being securitized.  In 1975, Sperry Cor-
poration began securitizing operating leases for computer equipment.  This 
transaction received a higher credit rating than Sperry’s own rating.  The 
securitization of other types of leases soon ensued, including the securitiza-
tion of automobile, equipment, and aircraft leases. 
Also, in 1985, automobile loans were first securitized by Marine Mid-
land Bank and Valley National Bank.32  Soon after, larger issuers began 
securitizing automobile loans, including General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration, Chrysler Financial Corporation, and Nissan Motors Acceptance 
Corp.33
By 1987, Bank of America and Republic Bank of Delaware offered se-
curities backed by credit card receivables.34  As early as 1994, securitiza-
tions of credit card receivables were increasing while mortgage securitiza-
tion began to significantly decline. 
The Federal Government also remained active in the securitization of 
financial assets other than residential mortgages.  The Federal Government 
has participated in the securitization of student loans through the Student 
Loan Marketing Association, also known as Sallie Mae, and agricultural 
loans through the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation or Farmer 
28
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1385. 
29
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 537. 
30
 Id.
31
 Id.
32
 Id. at 538.  Because of their predictable payment patterns and standardized terms, automobile 
loans have become popular subjects of securitization transactions.  Cosentino, supra note 6, at 546. 
33
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 538. 
34
 Id.  Like automobile loans, credit card receivables have become popular targets of securitiza-
tion because of their predictable payment patterns and standardized terms.  Cosentino, supra note 6, at 
546. 
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Mac.35  The Resolution Trust Corporation soon began to securitize commer-
cial mortgages obtained from insolvent thrifts.36
Recent years have seen the securitization of assets that are very differ-
ent from loan and lease receivables.  These assets include tax lien receiv-
ables and taxicab medallions.37  Perhaps the most unique securitization is 
that of royalties to David Bowie songs.38  In 1997, David Bowie raised $55 
million by issuing securities backed by royalties on his first twenty five 
albums.39
The spread of securitization to financial assets other than residential 
mortgages has resulted in a constant evolution of securitization transactions 
to more complex structures.  Changes in regulatory treatment have resulted 
in the creation of various types of credit enhancement, other than implicit 
and explicit government guarantees, including cash collateral accounts, 
spread accounts, and subordinated interests.40  Entities known as master 
trust vehicles or securitization conduits have also evolved from different 
types of securitization transactions.41  These entities permit an issuer to con-
tinuously purchase financial assets and to issue new securities against the 
assets without the need to create a new entity for each purchase.42  In addi-
tion, multi-originator conduits which allow different originators to sell their 
assets to one entity which then issues securities against the assets have also 
come into existence as a result of the various different types of securitiza-
tions.43
Despite the spread of securitization across many different types of fi-
nancial assets, the securitization of small business loans has remained rela-
tively unsuccessful.  While some success has been seen in the area of Small 
Business Administration loans, conventional small business loans have 
rarely been securitized.44
Securitization of SBA loans has had success for several reasons.  First, 
the loans are guaranteed by the Small Business Administration and thus, 
35
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217. 
36
 Id.
37
 Id. at 219. 
38
 Id.
39
 Adam Grant, Ziggy Stardust Reborn: A Proposed Modification of the Bowie Bond, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1291, 1291-92 (2001). 
40
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 539.   
41
 Id.
42
 Id.
43
 Id.
44
 Kenneth Temkin & Roger C. Kormendi, An Exploration of a Secondary Market for Small 
Business Loans, SBA Office of Advocacy, 13 (2003), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/re 
search/rs227_tot.pdf.  Between 1994 and 2000, there were only 59 securitization transactions that used 
unguaranteed portions of SBA loans or conventional small business loans.  Id.  These transactions only 
included $6.9 billion of loans.  Id.  To the contrary, 43% of SBA loans were securitized between 1995 
and 2000.  Id. at 14.     
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carry no credit or default risk.45  Second, the loans have uniform underwrit-
ing standards and documentation, making their payment patterns easy to 
predict.46  Even the unguaranteed portions of SBA loans have been success-
ful in securitization transactions because they too benefit from uniform 
documentation and underwriting standards.47
Conventional small business loans are traditionally decided using what 
is known as relationship underwriting.48  As a result, conventional small 
business loans lack the homogeneity of other types of financial assets that 
have had success in securitization transactions.49  Conventional small busi-
ness loans do not possess predictable payment patterns and thus, their credit 
or default risk is difficult to ascertain.50  Several solutions could improve the 
outlook of conventional small business loan securitizations.  These solu-
tions begin with the creation of a government-sponsored entity similar to 
Freddie Mac in order to begin creating an efficient secondary market for 
conventional small business loans.51  The creation of such a market will 
impose uniform documentation and underwriting standards on originators 
of conventional small business loans wishing to securitize their loans.52
This would result in moving away from relationship underwriting as a 
method of making loan decisions to credit scoring models that are already 
available in the marketplace.53  By doing so, it now would become easier to 
predict the payment patterns of conventional small business loans.54  More-
over, the creation of a government-sponsored entity will enhance the confi-
dence investors have in securities backed by conventional small business 
loans.55
45
 Id.
46
 Id.
47
 Id.  The unguaranteed portions of SBA loans are also developing a secondary market with 
about 8.5% of the total unguaranteed volume being securitized between 1995 and 2000.  Id.
48
 Id. at 5.  There has been a trend towards automated credit scoring models as more originators 
are beginning to use them to underwrite small business loans.  Id. at 9. 
49
 Id. at 10.  For the most part, lenders decide small business loan applications based on the in-
formation gained through the borrower’s banking relationship, their business model, and management 
expertise.  Id.
50
 Id. at 5.   
51
 Id. at 28. 
52
 Id.
53
 Just as government involvement in the securitization of residential mortgages resulted in uni-
form underwriting standards, the securitization of conventional small business loans by government 
sponsored enterprises will result in uniform underwriting standards.  Credit scoring models are readily 
available for small business loans and the current trend is that originators are adopting these technolo-
gies to make decisions on small business loan applications. 
54
 Credit scoring “models provide for an objective and easily analyzed assessment of the risks 
associated with a given loan.”  Id. at 10. 
55
 In order to securitize small business loans, there must be investors willing to purchase securi-
ties backed by them.  Bushaw, supra note 6, at 226.  Interest depends on the risk and return characteris-
tics of securities backed by small business loans.  Id.  Securities issued by Government-sponsored enti-
ties are “generally regarded to carry an implicit guarantee.”  Id. at 252.  This implicit guarantee in-
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Another solution is to create credit enhancement mechanisms where 
the federal government guarantees a portion of the underlying small busi-
ness loans in the securitization transactions.56  This would decrease or 
eliminate the credit risk associated with the small business loans.57  This 
would also increase the confidence investors have in securities backed by 
conventional small business loans.58
B. The Intricacies of a Securitization Transaction 
In order to understand what needs to be done to improve the prospects 
of small business loan securitizations, it is important to understand the intri-
cacies of a securitization transaction.   
Securitization is the sale of securities backed by an income-producing 
asset or pool of assets.59  Firms employ securitization as a form of trans-
forming illiquid financial assets into liquid securities which in turn become 
cash.60  The goal of a securitization transaction is to package cash flows 
from income-producing assets into a security that is of high quality and 
saleable on the capital markets.61  A securitization transaction is structured 
creases confidence in securities backed by small business loans since the likelihood of default on those 
securities is minimal.  
56
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 28. 
57
 All forms of credit enhancement serve the purpose of decreasing the risk inherent in securitized 
assets.  See discussion infra Part II.B.1.  In the case of a credit enhancement provided by the govern-
ment, credit risk is entirely eliminated on that portion of assets which are guaranteed.   
58
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 226.  The willingness of investors to purchases securities backed by 
small business loans hinges on the risk and return characteristics of the securities.  Id.  Securities which 
are backed by government guaranteed assets have significantly reduced the credit risk associated with 
theses assets and, naturally, investors’ confidence in the securities is increased. 
59
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1374. 
60
 Id. at 1373; see also Lynn A. Soukup, When Assets Become Securities: The ABC’s of Asset 
Securitization, 6-DEC BUS. L. TODAY 20, 20 (1996) (“Asset securitization transactions benefit issuers 
by providing liquidity or working capital at interest rates that are often significantly more favorable than 
what the creditworthiness of the owner of the assets [the originator] would support in a more conven-
tional financing.”); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. 
& Fin. 133, 136 (1994) (“Securitization is most valuable when the cost of funds, reflected in the interest 
rate that is necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPV’s securities, is less than the cost of the 
originator’s other, direct sources of funds.”). 
61
 Hill, supra note 20, at 1073-74.   High quality of a security hinges on the assurance of repay-
ment and is demonstrated through high ratings, for the most part.  Id. at 1073  In addition, the security 
could carry with it other assurances of repayment such as third party guarantees, over collateralization, 
and liquidity facilities.  Id.  These are known as credit enhancements.  Id.  The ability to securitize 
highly rated assets is especially enticing to firms that carry a low rating.  Id.  Securitization enables these 
firms to issue securities based on highly rated assets or receivables and “[leave] behind the firm and its 
undesirable attributes.”  Id.  The firms can attach third party appraisals (ratings), and credit enhance-
ments to lower their cost of funds through the securitization because a security that is saleable in the 
capital markets normally carries with it the lowest cost of funds.  Id. at 1074.  
To be saleable on the capital markets, securities must have characteristics that permit liquid-
ity…. They must be comparatively cheap and easy to appraise, buy, hold, and sell….  Purchases 
and sales also must be comparatively easy: the security’s general features, such as payment 
80
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to minimize or shift risks inherent in the underlying assets and to ensure 
that securities backed by these assets are readily marketable.62  Assets with 
standardized terms such as uniform underwriting and predictable losses that 
can be demonstrated through actuarial analysis are suitable for securitiza-
tion.63  For the most part, investors in asset-backed securities make judg-
ments as to the quality of the security and the required rate of return based 
on the ratings assigned to the security by the major rating agencies and 
other credit enhancements structured into the securitization transaction.64
Thus, it is important to focus on how the structure of the securitization 
transaction, including the selection of assets, method of transfer, type of 
security issued, and any safeguards attached to the transaction, will affect 
the ratings given to the securities by the major rating agencies. 
In a securitization transaction, an originator transfers financial assets, 
such as loans, leases, and receivables, to an entity sometimes known as a 
Special Purpose Vehicle, which issues securities to investors and uses the 
proceeds from the sale of these securities to pay the originator for the as-
sets.65  The Special Purpose Vehicle issues claims or securities against the 
terms and denominations, must be of more than idiosyncratic appeal, and the transaction costs 
of purchasing and selling the security must be comparatively low.  
Id.; see also Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 137 (“A securitization transaction can provide obvious cost 
savings by permitting an originator whose debt securities are rated less than investment grade or whose 
securities are unrated to obtain funding through an SPV whose debt securities have an investment grade 
rating.”). 
62
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1374-75. 
63
 Id. at 1377. 
64
 Hill, supra note 20, at 1072.  Rating agencies play an integral role in the determination of 
quality of securities arising out of a securitization transaction. 
Pool securities are almost always passive investments.  Many investors make no investigation 
or appraisal of the securities or the underlying collateral, the receivable, beyond simply review-
ing the offering documents.  Rather, ratings and a third party guarantee, (and perhaps overcol-
lateralization) often substitute for investor appraisal of the receivables.  Investors need consider 
only the terms of the pool securities, the rating, and the stature of the guarantor. 
Id. at 1073; 
Investors in asset-backed securities generally receive the benefit of a review by one or more na-
tionally recognized rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch, and Duff & 
Phelps.  The agencies focus on the origination and servicing of the assets being securitized and 
the structure of the securitization . . . . 
See Soukup, supra note 60, at 20. 
The interest rate necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPV’s securities is often a func-
tion of the “rating” that the SPV’s debt securities receive.  Such ratings are determined by vari-
ous independent private companies that have gained widespread investor acceptance as “rating 
agencies.”  Given that most investors, except certain institutional investors in private placement 
transactions (discussed below), have neither the time nor the resources to fully investigate the 
financial condition of the companies in which they invest, these ratings take on special signifi-
cance.  Investors rely on the assigned ratings to determine the minimum return that they will 
accept on a given investment. 
See Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 136. 
65
 Culver, supra note 7, at 34; see also Yuliya A. Dvorak, Transplanting Asset Securitization: Is 
the Grass Green Enough on the Other Side?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 541, 546 (2001).  In their simplest form, 
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pool of assets in the form of debt or equity.66  The asset or pool of assets 
that are securitized are financial or income-producing assets, meaning that 
they generate cash flows from which payments are made to the holders of 
the debt or equity instruments that are issued.67
In making a securitization transaction attractive to investors in the 
capital markets, the transaction should be structured to (1) minimize asset 
risks by carefully selecting and enhancing the pool of assets and (2) mini-
mize entity risks by creating a bankruptcy remote Special Purpose Vehicle.  
In the upcoming sub-sections, the analysis will focus on how the handling 
of asset and entity risks affects the rating determinations of the major rating 
agencies which are very influential in ascertaining the quality and market-
ability of the securities issued in a securitization transaction.  
1. Selecting and Enhancing the Pool of Assets 
The assets involved in a securitization transaction are normally illiquid 
financial assets that produce a cash flow from which the holders of the se-
curities issued in the transaction can be paid.68  The assets typically repre-
sent rights to future monies or payments at future dates and are referred to 
as “receivables.”69  The assets must be self-liquidating assets that will serve 
as the source of payments on the asset backed security and the payment 
performance of the assets “must be susceptible to evaluation.”70  As stated 
above, assets most suitable for securitization have standardized terms, ex-
pected losses that can be predicted,71 and have uniform underwriting stan-
dards and servicing procedures.72  Receivables with a higher rate of default 
may still be securitized as long as the rate of default can be predicted.73
Normally, the assets, by themselves, are not saleable in the capital markets 
asset securitizations involve a sale of financial assets by an originator to a separate corporation or trust, 
usually called an SPV. The SPV raises the purchase price by selling debt or equity interests.  “This 
series of transactions leaves the investors with claims against the SPV, the SPV with the assets trans-
ferred by the originator, and the originator with the proceeds of the transaction.”  Id.
66
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1378. 
67
 Robert R. Veach, Jr., Securitization of Assets, 30 Mar. BULL. BUS. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 23, 24-25
(1993); see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1376-77, 80; see also Dvorak, supra note 65, at 
546-47 (assets being securitized can be of various natures, including oil and gas, lease, auto loan or 
credit receivables, commercial mortgage loans, state lottery winnings, litigation settlement payments, 
and royalties). 
68
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1376. 
69
 Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 135; see also Hill, supra note 20, at 1067.  
70
 Soukup, supra note 60, at 21. 
71
 Id. (“With a pool of consumer receivables, a statistical analysis of the historical performance of 
similar consumer receivables is used to evaluate payment, delinquency, default and recovery rates.  A 
pool composed of fewer assets that are not readily subject to statistical analysis—such as a pool of 
commercial mortgage loans—generally will require underwriting of the individual assets, and the rating 
agencies usually have specific criteria for the assets to be included in the pool.”). 
72
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1377. 
73
 Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 135. 
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because they require costly monitoring and appraisal, and their payment 
terms may be unpredictable.74
“Asset risks” are those risks which are inherent in the receivables,75
“such as the possibility that account debtors may fail to pay on time and in 
full.”76  Once all the asset risks have been analyzed and projected, the types 
and amounts of credit enhancement for the asset-backed securities are es-
tablished.77
A securitization transaction is structured to minimize the effects of 
these risks through the use of credit enhancements designed to reduce risk 
and improve the marketability of the securities issued.78  Through the use of 
the various credit enhancement mechanisms, the Special Purpose Vehicles 
are able to receive a higher credit rating than the originator, allowing it to 
secure financing at a lower cost.79  Credit enhancement serves two broad 
purposes: first, it bridges the gap between the limitations of the issuer and 
the demands of the investor,80 and second, it provides an analytical service 
74
 Hill, supra note 20, at 1074; see also Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 144 (quoting PETER H. WEIL,
FACTORING IN ASSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 27.01(1) (Matthew Bender ed., 
1985)) (the sale of the individual receivables is known as factoring). 
75
 The most important risks in an asset-backed security include credit risk, liquidity risk, refinanc-
ing risk, reinvestment risk, administration performance risk, currency and interest rate risk, swap coun-
terparty risk, and credit risk on mortgage indemnity guarantee provider.  For a detailed explanation of 
each individual risk, see Fredrik Månsson, Credit Enhancement, in THE GLOBAL ASSET BACKED 
SECURITIES MARKET 169, 169-71 (Charles Stone et al. eds., 1993). 
76
 Dvorak, supra note 64, at 550 (By contrast, “Entity Risks” are the risks inherent in the origina-
tor.  More specifically, entity risk is the risk that an originator’s potential insolvency will affect the 
payment of cash flows to investors.).  Entity risks will be addressed in the next section in the analysis of 
the choice of entity.  
77
 Soukup, supra note 60, at 21. 
78
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1379 (securitization transaction is structured to reduce 
risks inherent in the underlying assets, and to permit, to the greatest extent possible, the ready resale of 
the securities issued); see also Hill, supra note 20, at 1072 (the transaction may include a guarantee of 
repayment by a highly rated third party guarantor, overcollateralization, and liquidity facilities—if the 
repayment patterns of the underlying receivables are less predictable); Dvorak, supra note 65, at 560 
(“Credit enhancement, among other things, allows the SPV to address the default risk through the use of 
guarantees, letters of credit, irrevocable credit lines, third-party insurance, or over-collateralization.”); 
and CHRISTINE A. PAVEL, SECURITIZATION: THE ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOAN-
BASED/ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 17 (1989) (“The riskiness of an asset-backed security is 
the main determinant of its price.  The riskier the security, the lower the price, and therefore the yield. . . 
.  Several options to decrease the riskiness of an issue are available to a securities issuer, however.”). 
79
 Dvorak, supra note 65, at 560. 
80
 In transactions as complex as public asset-backed securities, the credit quality and cash  flow 
characteristics of a given asset pool will rarely match exactly the investors’ objectives. . . . 
Credit enhancement is a tool that helps bridge this gap—enabling issues to be structured with 
the cash flow timing and certainty that investors require, while retaining the flexibility that is-
suers need to meet accounting, regulatory, and funding goals.  
Russell B. Brewer II & Linda S. Iseley, Credit Enhancement for Asset-Backed Transactions, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 127, 128-29 (Jess Lederman ed., 1990).  
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for investors.81  The different types of credit enhancements are either inter-
nal82 or external.83
Internal credit enhancements include over-collateralization, excess 
spread accounts, and senior-subordinate structure.84  Over-collateralization 
is where the face value of the assets transferred is greater than the face 
value of the securities to be issued in order to allow for probable losses.85
For example, assume that a pool of loans has a face value of $10 million 
while the securities being issued against the pool only has a face value of $9 
million.  The securities are over-collateralized by $1 million.86  As a result, 
the excess $1 million acts as a loan loss reserve providing a credit en-
hancement to investors.87
The second type of internal credit enhancement is an “excess spread 
account,” where the excess cash flow derived from the pool of assets, be-
cause of the difference between the interest rate of the underlying pool and 
the interest rate paid to investors, is held in an account and used as a loan 
loss reserve.88  For example the average interest rate for a pool of assets 
may be nine percent while the average interest rate of the securities issued 
is eight percent.  The excess of one percent is held in an account and used 
as a loan loss reserve, providing a credit enhancement for investors.89
The third internal credit enhancement, a senior-subordinate structure, 
is present where the SPV issues several classes or tranches of securities 
against the pool of assets.  For example, the issuance could include senior 
and subordinated debt.  “Through this type of structure, the subordinated 
tranche bears the default risk on the underlying loans, and only if the subor-
dinated tranche and other forms of credit are insufficient to bear the loss 
does the investment grade carry any risk.”90  The subordinated tranche acts 
as a loan loss reserve, and the size of the reserve depends on the risk of the 
81
 Because a credit enhancer is putting its capital at risk against the total financing, it does an in-
depth analysis of the performance to be expected from the security and investors benefit from this analy-
sis.  Id. at 129. 
82
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 15 (internal credit enhancements are provided by the 
underlying assets themselves); see also Bushaw, supra note 6, at 224 (“The pool of assets itself can be 
structured to reduce the risk that cash flow from the assets will not be available to pay the securities 
when due.”). 
83
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 15 (“External credit enhancements are provided by 
third parties who offer financial guaranty insurance issued by monoline insurers.”); see also Bushaw, 
supra note 6, at 224 (“External methods of credit support may be used to enhance the credit ratings of 
the securities issued by the SPV.”). 
84
 Id.; see also Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 15. 
85
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 224. 
86
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44,  at 15-16. 
87
 Id. at 16. 
88
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 224; Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 16. 
89 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 224. 
90 Id.
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underlying assets.91  The subordinated tranche functions as a credit en-
hancement, allowing the senior tranche to receive a higher rating. 
External credit enhancements include recourse to the originator, third-
party recourse, or other forms of credit support.92  External credit enhance-
ment “can take the form of an insurance policy issued by a financial guar-
antee insurance company,93 a letter of credit issued by a bank,94 a corporate 
guarantee,95 or a reserve account funded by a third party.96”97  The simplest 
form of credit enhancement is direct recourse to the originator in the form 
of an unsecured obligation.98  Third party guarantors, such as insurance 
companies, structure securitization transactions so that they incur no losses 
by requiring that the expected loss from the underlying assets is covered 
through first loss protection in the form of over collateralization and other 
91
 The higher the risk that is inherent in the underlying assets, the larger the size of the subordi-
nated tranche needs to be so that the rating of the senior tranche can be suitable to investors.  Temkin & 
Kormendi, supra note 44, at 15. 
92
 Recourse to the originator or a third-party can be in the form of a letter of credit or other con-
tractual relationships such as guarantees.  Other forms of external credit support include default insur-
ance.  Bushaw, supra note 6, at 224-25. 
93
 See Månsson, supra note 75, at 171 (“An insurance company will enter into an insurance 
contract with the issuer under which it agrees to indemnify the issuer in respect of credit losses originat-
ing from the underlying pool of financial assets.”); see also Lina Hsu & Cyrus Mohebbi, Credit En-
hancement in ABS Structures, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 277, 278-79 (Anand K. Bhattacharya & 
Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1996) (The most common technique of external credit enhancement is provided 
by monoline insurance companies such as Municipal Bond Investors Assurance, Financial Guaranty 
Insurance Company, and  others.  These entities insure investment grade rated cash flows for an up front 
fee determined by the desired rating level.). 
94
 See Månsson, supra note 75, at 172 (“One solution to both the credit risk and the liquidity risk 
is to have a bank or an insurance company with the appropriate rating to issue a guarantee, which covers 
the SPV against the credit and liquidity risk in the portfolio.”); see also Hsu & Mohebbi, supra note 93, 
at 279 (A letter of credit is an insurance policy issued by a financial institution that carries a credit rating 
higher than the security being guaranteed.  Under the letter of credit, the financial institution is obligated 
to reimburse losses up to a specified amount.). 
95 Hsu & Mohebbi, supra note 92, at 279. (“[A] corporate guarantee protects bond holders from 
losses due to default, bankruptcy, fraud, and standard and special hazards of the underlying assets, with 
full recourse to the guarantor.  The rating of the security is directly affected by any upgrade or down-
grade of the guarantor as the highest rating an insured security can obtain is the rating of the guaran-
tor.”). 
96
 Id. at 279-80 (A “Cash Control Account” is a loan to the issuing trust with the proceeds rein-
vested in some short-term eligible investments and repaid through excess spread from the transaction.).  
This method of credit and liquidity protection has been used in, for instance, securitizations of 
credit card receivables in the US.  A substantial amount of cash, maybe 6-10 percent of the total issue 
size, is placed in an escrow account at the beginning of the transaction.  The cash is used to pay credit 
losses in the asset portfolio and to take care of temporary liquidity problems. 
See Månsson, supra note 75, at 172. 
97
 Len Blum & Chris DiAngelo, Structuring Efficient Asset-Backed Transactions, in ISSUER 
PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITIZATION 17, 30 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998). 
98
 While it is the simplest form of enhancement, it is the most difficult for an investor to evaluate 
because the investor must evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the issuer and must consider any 
correlation between the risks associated with the pool of assets and the issuer.  Brewer & Iseley, supra 
note 80, at 131. 
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credit enhancers before it is covered by their guarantee.  Thus, financial 
guarantees are typically considered second loss protection and only come 
into effect if the first loss protection fails to cover the losses stemming from 
the underlying assets.99
In order to make securities issued by a Special Purpose Vehicle mar-
ketable at an interest rate attractive to investors, investors must be shielded 
from asset risks such as liquidity and credit risks through the use of credit 
enhancement.100  The amount of credit enhancement used in a particular 
transaction is a direct function of the risk of the underlying assets, and the 
costs associated with different types of credit enhancement.101  Many securi-
tizations are complex and include a combination of more than one type of 
credit enhancement.102  In the case of monoline insurance, the guarantor will 
not insure the security unless it is rated at an investment-grade level, mean-
ing that other types of credit enhancements are typically needed in addition 
to monoline insurance.103
2. Striving for a Bankruptcy Proof Special Purpose Vehicle 
Entity risks are those risks associated with the economic prospects of 
the originator and the issuer, such as their general credit rating and the pos-
sibility that either will end up in bankruptcy.104  Investors in asset backed 
securities expect to have certain asset risks, but do not expect to incur risks 
related to the insolvency of the originators in a securitization transaction.  
For that reason, rating agencies require that Special Purpose Vehicles are 
bankruptcy remote in order for the transaction to receive a rating that makes 
issued securities saleable on the capital markets.  Bankruptcy remoteness is 
generally accomplished by limiting the scope of the SPV’s business, re-
stricting the liabilities the SPV may incur, preserving the separate identity 
of the SPV, and ensuring that the key parties to a transaction not file for 
bankruptcy.105  In order to minimize or eliminate entity risks, an ideal secu-
ritization attempts to ensure that the asset or pool of assets are segregated 
99
 Mahesh K. Kotecha, The Role of Financial Guarantees in Asset-Backed Securities, in ISSUER 
PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITIZATION 93, 103 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998). 
100
 Culver, supra note 7, at 35. 
101
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 16; see also Pavel, supra note 77, at 32 (“Riskier deals 
require a higher level of credit enhancement.”); see also Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 97, at 255-56 
(credit enhancement decisions are based on the costs associated with the various forms of credit en-
hancement). 
102
 For instance, it is possible for an asset backed security to have a senior-subordinate structure, 
over-collateralization, and a spread account, all forms of internal credit enhancement.  The issuer may 
also decide to use an external credit enhancement as well.  Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 16.    
103
 Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 97, at 253. 
104
 Dvorak, supra note 65, at 550. 
105
 Stephen H. Case, I Thought I Put That Where You Couldn’t Reach It: Bankruptcy-Remote 
Entities, Special Purpose Vehicles and Other Securitization Issues, 853 PRAC. LAW. INST. COM. L. &
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 53, 68 (2003). 
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from the originator’s other assets and that the Special Purpose Vehicle is 
created in a manner that significantly limits the likelihood of insolvency.106
Transferring the assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle that is restricted to 
owning and servicing the assets minimizes the risks associated with the 
possible insolvency of the originator and the Special Purpose Vehicle.107
Securitization transactions should not strive to be bankruptcy remote, but to 
be bankruptcy proof.  While avoiding consolidation of assets and ensuring 
that the assets are transferred as a true sale can achieve bankruptcy remote-
ness, constructing the Special Purpose Vehicle so that it cannot engage in 
activities that expose it to undue risk of its own would make the securitiza-
tion transaction near bankruptcy proof status.108
In order to make a securitization transaction of high quality and sale-
able in the capital markets, entity risks must be minimized.  This section 
addresses how these risks can be minimized within the structure of the 
transaction.  In order to minimize the entity risks associated with a securiti-
zation transaction, an SPV must be (1) bankruptcy remote, or protected 
from the potential insolvency of the originator, and then (2) bankruptcy 
proof, or protected from the potential insolvency of the SPV, itself. 
a) Bankruptcy Remoteness: True Sale, Substantive Consolidation, and 
Fraudulent Conveyance.  There are three ways that the assets can become 
exposed to bankruptcy risk associated with the originator.  First, the transfer 
from the originator to the Special Purpose Vehicle is not treated as a “true 
sale” but as a pledge of collateral, and the assets become part of the bank-
ruptcy estate.109  Second, the assets may be substantively consolidated with 
those of the originator or another entity in a bankruptcy proceeding involv-
ing the originator or other entity.110  Finally, the transfer can be treated as a 
fraudulent conveyance.111  These three exposures to bankruptcy risk should 
be addressed in order to ensure that a securitization is bankruptcy remote.  
As discussed above, rating agencies require Special Purpose Vehicles to be 
bankruptcy remote in order to ensure a rating making securities issued by 
such entities saleable on the capital markets.  In order to achieve bank-
ruptcy remoteness, (i) the transaction must avoid being recharacterized as a 
secured loan; (ii) the assets and liabilities of the SPV must avoid being con-
solidated with the originator; and (iii) the transfer must not constitute a 
fraudulent conveyance.
106
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1377; see also Soukup, supra note 60, at 21. 
107
 Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization Vehicles, Fiduciary Duties, and Bondholder’s Rights, 24 J.
CORP. L. 295, 305-06 (1999); see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1377. 
108
 Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 97, at 23. 
109
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1377 n.35; see also Ellis, supra note 107, at 305. 
110
 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1377 n.35. 
111
 Id.
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i. True Sale Characterization.  A bankruptcy court may find that the 
transfer of assets was not a “true sale,” but a mere pledge for a secured loan 
and recharacterize the securitization transaction as such.112  This would ex-
pose the assets or pool of assets to risks associated with the potential insol-
vency of the originator.  In order to structure a securitization as bankruptcy 
remote, it is important to ensure that the transaction is a true sale, making 
the securities issued against the pool of assets more attractive to investors 
and saleable in the capital markets.  Moreover, if a transaction is character-
ized as a true sale, it is unlikely that the transaction will be considered a 
fraudulent conveyance.  There are several requirements for ensuring that a 
transaction is a true sale.  In determining whether a transaction is a true 
sale, courts frequently look at the intent of the parties by conducting “an 
investigation of the true nature of the transaction, examining the parties’ 
practices, objectives, business activities and relationships.”113  Courts often 
look to the language and form of the transaction to determine whether the 
intent was to sell or to pledge assets for a secured loan.114  The most promi-
112
 Labeling a transfer a sale does not in itself make it a true sale: 
Recharacterization cases are centuries old.  They illustrate that the law may not treat a 
transaction as a sale just because the buyer and seller labeled it a sale.  If the buyer later at-
tempts to enforce its rights as a buyer and someone (usually the seller or its creditors) then 
challenges the sale as a loan, a court, under certain circumstances, could recharacterize the 
sale as a loan. 
Peter V. Pantaleo, et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW.
159, 164 (1996). 
113
 Marsha E. Simms, 754 Prac. L. Inst. Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series 335, 345-46 
(1997). 
114
 Ellis supra note 107, at 305. 
[T]rue-sale treatment typically requires that the language and the form of the transaction reflect 
that the intent of the parties is to sell rather than secure and should refer to sale, not the pledge 
or grant of a security interest; that the transfer of the assets should be through a formal instru-
ment of transfer, such as an assignment or bill of sale; that the sale should be for a valid busi-
ness or legal purpose; and the entire purchase price should not be in the form of a promissory 
note or other indebtedness.  Similarly, the transfer of the assets should transfer the burden or 
risk of loss associated with the assets.  Generally, the originator-seller should not warrant, guar-
antee, or indemnify the purchaser nor permit adjustments to the purchase price for the assets on 
account of under-performance beyond historical levels of lost collectibility.  Providing any 
mechanism to offset the risk of loss on the assets, such as (i) adding, repurchasing or substitut-
ing assets for those conveyed, (ii) providing additional security for losses or grossly over-
collateralizing the asset pool vis-à-vis the sale price, or (iii) tying payment for the assets on the 
performance of the assets will upset any attempt to characterize the transfer of the assets as a 
sale.  Lastly, the transfer of the assets should be treated as a sale for tax, accounting, and busi-
ness purposes and should be accompanied by notice to third parties affected by the transfer. 
Id.
Where other factors are present, the courts will often discuss the language that the parties have 
used in the document or agreement governing the transaction.  Courts focus on terms such as 
“security” or “collateral” where the other factors indicate a loan, and on terms such as “sale” or 
“absolutely convey” where other factors support (or do not preclude) sale treatment.  For one 
court, the language in an agreement and conduct of the parties triumphed over full recourse 
84
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nent factor that courts look to is the extent to which the risks and benefits of 
ownership have been transferred.115  In doing so, courts look to the level of 
recourse the SPV retains against the originator in the case of default,116 who 
retains the benefits of ownership,117 how the assets are serviced,118 how the 
provisions, and the court found a sale.  Most courts, however, deemphasize the language used 
in a document, and consider intent and actual conduct more relevant. 
Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of Receivables as a Sale or Secured Loan 
upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 194 (1991). 
115
 Simms, supra note 113, at 346. 
116
 Courts look to see if the owners and the SPV bear the risk of loss or whether the originator 
bears this risk.  Basically, “the greater the recourse the SPV has against the originator, as through 
chargebacks or adjustments to the purchase price, the more the transfer looks like a loan.”  Id.   
In several decisions courts have considered recourse to the seller for nonpayment of the trans-
ferred assets to be suggestive of a loan rather than a sale.  This recourse may take the form of a 
repurchase obligation, a guaranty of collectibility by the seller, a failure to extinguish or reduce 
an independent obligation for which an “absolute assignment” was made, or a hold back of re-
serves from the purchase price which are released to the seller only as receivables are paid. 
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 114, at 186. 
Recourse to a seller who warrants performance of the asset it sells (i.e., collectibility) should 
not turn a sale into a loan.  Under the case law, however, an absolute promise by the seller to 
repay the purchase price, with an agreed upon rate of return unrelated to the payment terms of 
the underlying asset, clearly risks turning a sale into a loan.  In recognizing this principle, it is 
important to understand that the difference between recourse for collectibility and economic re-
course is not the difference between a buyer accepting significant financial risk and one who 
accepts none.  In fact, in some situations, the economic bargain between a true buyer of a finan-
cial asset who has recourse for collectibility and a lender with economic recourse can be 
roughly equal.  On the one hand, a true buyer, unlike a lender, cannot adjust its return after the 
purchase to ensure a market return at all times.  A buyer, however, would enjoy the upside in 
value if, for instance, the asset was collected earlier than the parties expected.  And so long as 
the buyer has recourse for collectibility, it could protect itself against the underlying obligor’s 
default. 
The real difference between recourse for collectibility and economic recourse is what each says 
about the type of transaction the parties intended.  Recourse for collectibility merely improves 
the quality of the asset transferred.  The purchaser with recourse cannot do better economically 
than the purchaser without recourse if the asset performs in accordance with its terms.  The 
economic terms of the transaction are defined by the cash flows of the asset itself and collecti-
bility recourse is defined solely by the failure of the asset to perform.  On the other hand, eco-
nomic recourse is some fashion guarantees the return of the purchaser without regard to the 
economic characteristics of the transferred asset.  In the truest sense of the word, the transferred 
asset serves merely as collateral, as its own financial characteristics do not serve to define the 
economic terms of the transaction.  Transfers with economic recourse look and smell like loans, 
and because enforcing important state law policies—like prohibiting usury—turned on deter-
mining the appropriate characterization of transactions, courts historically have had little hesita-
tion recharacterizing such transfers as loans. 
Pantaleo, et al., supra note 112, at 171-72 (Sales with recourse for collectibility are consistent with the 
concept of a sale and do not bear similarities to a loan, while sales with economic recourse bear similari-
ties to a loan.  Recharacterization is appropriate only if there is economic resource).  
117
 If the originator retains the right to surplus received in excess of the purchase price paid for the 
assets, or the right to repurchase the assets by paying the purchase price, the originator may appear to 
have retained the benefits of ownership.  Simms, supra note 113, at 346. 
In several decisions courts have held that overcollateralization, with a right in the seller to retain 
eventual collections on accounts over and above a predetermined amount of collections, is evi-
dence of a loan rather than a sale….Courts have sometimes held that the seller’s ability to re-
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purchase price is calculated,119 and whether account or asset debtors are 
notified of the transfer.120  If a transaction is considered a true sale, it is 
likely that it is shielded from a possible bankruptcy involving the originator. 
ii. Equitable Doctrine of Substantive Consolidation.  Without recharac-
terizing a transaction as a secured loan, a court may still expose the asset or 
pool of assets in a securitization transaction to bankruptcy proceedings in-
volving the originator by invoking the equitable doctrine of substantive 
consolidation by determining that the originator and the SPV were func-
tionally interchangeable.121  By invoking the doctrine of substantive con-
solidation, courts are able to disregard the separateness of the SPV and the 
originator and pool the SPV’s assets and liabilities and treat them as if the 
originator held them.122  “[T]he following two-part balancing test to deter-
mine when a substantive consolidation is appropriate: (1) whether there is a 
‘substantial identity between the entities to be consolidated;’ and (2) 
whether ‘[substantive] consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to 
realize some benefit.”123  In determining whether the two entities are inex-
tricably entwined, courts look to several factors including: 
gain its prior interest in the accounts through the option of repurchase, by itself or a third party 
on its behalf, indicated that the transaction was a security device, rather than a sale.  The repur-
chase option has been viewed in other contexts as a retention of potential benefits (as opposed 
to risks) of the receivables. 
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 114, at 192-93. 
118
 If the SPV or someone other than the originator may not transfer the servicing function, the 
originator may have retained the benefits of ownership.  It is common practice, however, for the origina-
tor to continue to act as servicer for a fee, as an agent of the SPV.  The originator must service the assets 
based on agreed upon procedures.  Simms, supra note 113, at 347.   
A number of courts have noted that the seller’s continued servicing of transferred accounts indi-
cates a loan rather than a sale. . . .  One court has concluded, however, that a mortgage broker’s 
continued servicing of mortgage payments pursuant to an agency agreement among purchasers 
of interests in the mortgages, which agreement included a separate collection agent fee for the 
broker, was evidence of a sale. 
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 114, at 191-92. 
119
 If the purchase price is a fixed price not subject to change as the assets change, “sale charac-
terization is supported.”  Simms, supra note 113, at 347. 
120
 If the SPV retains the right to notify the account debtors that the assets or account has been 
transferred, sale characterization is supported.  Id. at 348. 
121
 Ellis, supra note 107, at 304-05; Angela Petrucci, Accounting for Asset Securitization in a Full 
Disclosure World, 30 J. LEGIS. 327, 335 (2004) (“Substantive consolidation, similar to a piercing the 
corporate veil theory, represents an equitable remedy imposed by bankruptcy courts in which the court 
will refuse to recognize the separate legal identities of two entities and will effectively consolidate the 
assets and liabilities of the involved companies.”). 
122
 Simms, supra note 113, at 350. 
123
 Petrucci, supra note 121, at 336; Simms, supra note 113, at 350 (“Substantive consolidation is 
an extraordinary remedy, and should be ordered only if the court finds that the prebankruptcy relation-
ships of the two entities are inextricably entwined, that substantial consolidation would benefit all credi-
tors, and that the creditors did not reasonably rely on the separate existence of each of the parties”). 
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(i) the degree of difficulty in segregating assets and liabilities; (ii) the 
presence of consolidated financial statements; (iii) increased profit-
ability due to consolidation at a single physical location; (iv) commin-
gling of assets and business functions; (v) unity of interests and own-
ership; (vi) existence of inter-corporate guaranties on loans; and (vii) 
transfer of assets without observance of corporate formalities.124
The second prong requires the court to determine whether substantive 
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or realize a benefit and be-
comes an equitable determination by the court.125  Some courts have de-
cided to add this economic balancing test to the existing factors, while other 
courts have used this test in place of the historical substantive consolidation 
test.126  By structuring and operating a Special Purpose Vehicle as an inde-
pendent entity, the likelihood of substantive consolidation is minimized 
greatly.  In order to operate as an independent entity, the Special Purpose 
Vehicle should comply with formalities, make independent decisions, pos-
sess its own assets, manage its own liabilities, maintain separate offices and 
financial statements, and deal with the originator at arm’s length.127
iii. Fraudulent Conveyance.  The third way that bankruptcy courts can 
subject a pool of assets to the potential bankruptcy of the originator is by 
finding that the transfer constitutes a fraudulent conveyance.  “[A] transfer 
is fraudulent if: (1) it was made with an intent to hinder, delay or defraud 
any creditor, or (2) the transferor received less than reasonably equivalent 
value for the transfer, and the effect of the transfer was to render the trans-
feror insolvent.”128
b) Bankruptcy Proof? Eliminating Potential Entity Risks.  Entity risks 
can be virtually eliminated by correctly structuring a Special Purpose Vehi-
cle so that it is restricted from engaging in activities which are unrelated to 
the securitization or financing transaction.  While it is not possible to re-
strict the Special Purpose Vehicle from filing for bankruptcy, it is possible 
to limit the risks the Special Purpose Vehicle is allowed to undertake by 
limiting the rights and powers of directors in the charter establishing the 
Special Purpose Vehicle.129  In general, the Special Purpose Vehicle should 
only undertake activities that are “necessary or incidental” to the securitiza-
124
 Ellis, supra note 107, at 306 n.61, citing In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). 
125
 Petrucci, supra note 121, at 336. 
126
 Ellis, supra note 107, at 306 n.61. 
127
 Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 559-60. 
128
 Simms, supra note 113, at 351. 
129
 See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 7, at 533. 
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tion.130  The charter of the Special Purpose Vehicle could limit the types of 
debt the Special Purpose Vehicle can incur to “the asset-backed securities 
and obligations to credit enhancers and liquidity providers,” all of which are 
necessary or incidental to the transaction.131  In addition, the charter of the 
Special Purpose Vehicle can provide that the underlying assets must be free 
of all liens, and “cannot be subjected to a voluntary lien or security interest 
in favor of anyone other than the holders of the asset-backed securities.”132
While the charter cannot contain provisions preventing the Special Purpose 
Vehicle from filing for bankruptcy, the entity can be structured in order to 
reduce the probability of an involuntary bankruptcy.  In order to minimize 
the risk of an involuntary bankruptcy, the SPV can require consensual 
creditors to sign an agreement not to file an involuntary bankruptcy claim 
against the SPV. 
While following corporate formalities of the Special Purpose Vehicle 
and ensuring that the transfer of assets to the Special Purpose Vehicle is 
considered a true sale will render the securities issued by the SPV saleable 
in the capital markets, striving to eliminate the possibility that the SPV it-
self can engage in activities that can potentially expose the pool of assets to 
bankruptcy proceedings will decrease or eliminate entity risks.  In doing so, 
rating agencies will improve the ratings of securities issued by the SPV 
proportionately.   
C. Why Firms Securitize their Assets 
The previous section discussed the intricacies of a securitization trans-
action in order to better understand how a transaction is structured to make 
it saleable in the capital markets.  In doing so, the focus was on minimizing 
or eliminating the risks which investors could potentially encounter in a 
securitization transaction.  While structuring the transaction in a manner 
that is attractive to rating agencies and investors is important, it is also im-
portant to understand the reasons firms participate in securitization transac-
tions.  Without providing firms an incentive for securitizing, it is highly 
unlikely that an efficient secondary market for a particular type of receiv-
able could be realized.   
The determination of whether a firm should securitize is a cost-benefit 
analysis.  If the benefit from securitizing financial assets exceeds the costs 
associated with doing so, the firm will likely choose to securitize.133  Thus, 
it is important to understand the costs and benefits associated with securiti-
zation transactions.   
130
 Id. at 554. 
131 Id.
132
 Id. at 554-55. 
133
 Pavel, supra note 78, at 11-12. 
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“The primary costs of securitization are the administrative costs, such 
as the investment banking fee, the fee to the rating agencies, the fee for 
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers, the fee to the trustee, and in some instances, 
the cost of private insurance.”134
The benefits of securitization include reducing risk, increased liquidity 
and diversification, new and less expensive funding, as well as a potential 
new source of fee income for originators.135  “A company considering secu-
ritization should compare (i) the expected differential between interest pay-
able on non-securitized financing and interest payable on securities issued 
by an applicable SPV with (ii) the expected difference in transaction costs 
between the alternative funding options.”136
The costs associated with a securitization transaction depend on how 
the securitization is structured.  If the securitization is done by creating a 
“one-off” securitization structure, the costs of the transaction can be quite 
high.137  However, securitizations can be structured in a manner that mini-
mizes transaction costs by selling the pool of assets to “multiseller securiti-
zation conduits.”138  In deciding whether to securitize a pool of assets, firms 
may look to multiseller securitization conduits in order to minimize the 
costs associated with the transaction.  However, if they seek added flexibil-
ity in structuring the transaction, a one-off securitization structure is the 
better choice. 
The most important benefit that firms derive from securitization is that 
they are able to obtain financing at a lower cost of funds than they normally 
would if they were to issue securities against the entire firm.  An originator 
whose securities are rated lower than investment grade or not rated at all 
derive benefits from securitization if the SPV can issue securities that are 
rated investment grade or higher.139  Originators who can issue securities 
rated investment grade or higher can still derive benefits from securitization 
if the SPV could issue securities rated higher than the originator’s securi-
134
 Id. at 12. 
135
 Id. at 13; George J. Bentson, The Future of Asset Securitization: The Benefits and Costs of 
Breaking Up the Bank, in THE GLOBAL ASSET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 3, 6 (Stone, et al. eds., 
1993). 
136
 Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 137-38. 
137
 One-off securitization structures are the most common form of Special Purpose Vehicle.  They 
are Special Purpose Vehicles which are created for a specific securitization transaction.  They are nor-
mally used because they provide the originator with flexibility to customize the securitization.  The costs 
associated with one-off vehicles are high because they are unable to achieve economies of scale through 
further securitization of assets.  Id. at 138. 
138
 Multiseller securitization conduits minimize transaction costs by allowing different originators 
the opportunity to share a common SPV.  These conduits are able to minimize costs by achieving 
economies of scale through continuous securitization of financial assets.  Id. at 140.   
139
 Id. at 137. 
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ties.140  In determining whether an originator receives cost savings from 
securitization, the interest savings must be weighed against the costs of the 
securitization transaction.   
While a lower cost of funds is essential to enticing firms to securitize 
their assets, other benefits increase the attractiveness of securitization.  
First, firms are able to improve their liquidity by transforming illiquid fi-
nancial assets into cash.  “[S]ecuritization converts future income streams 
into cash, giving companies new funds to apply to opportunities with 
greater profit potential than what is tied up in past lending decisions.”141  In 
doing so, they are reducing their exposure to credit risk as well as interest 
rate risk.  By selling off financial assets, firms no longer face the potential 
risk of interest rates going up making their assets unprofitable.  Moreover, 
they no longer face the potential default of borrowers because this risk has 
been transferred over to the investors in the securities issued by the SPV.142
By not having to face potential repayment risk, firms realize savings since 
they no longer have to maintain capital reserves guarding against this 
risk.143  Risk reduction plays an integral role in determining whether a firm 
benefits from securitizing their financial assets or receivables. 
III. ANALYSIS
In order to ensure that securitization of conventional small business 
loans is successful, it is important to minimize the asset and entity risks 
associated with such a transaction.144  The solution to minimizing these risks 
lies in (A) the creation of a government-sponsored entity for the purpose of 
securitizing conventional small business loans,145 (B) the adoption of credit 
scoring models in place of relationship underwriting when originators make 
140
 Id.
141
 Dvorak, supra note 65, at 549; see also Hill, supra note 19, at 1096-97 (Firms can concentrate 
on improving origination and servicing of receivables.).   
142
 Culver, supra note 7, at 36. (“In a properly structured asset securitization, the risk of repayment 
is transferred completely to the Special Purpose Vehicle and is no longer a contingent liability on the 
Originator’s balance sheet.”). 
143
 Id.
144
 Dvorak, supra note 65, at 550. 
145
 Drawing from the experience of residential mortgages, it becomes apparent that successful 
securitization has, historically, been the result of the government’s involvement in such transactions.  
See Lisa M. Fairfax, When You Wish Upon a Star: Explaining the Cautious Growth of Royalty-Backed 
Securitization, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 441, 447-49 (1999). The government’s involvement in mort-
gage securitizations by implicitly and/or explicitly guaranteeing such transactions encouraged investors 
to invest in securities that were now relatively low-risk investments.  Id.  In doing so, the government 
was able to ensure that adequate financing for housing was available as a result of increased securitiza-
tion.  Id.   
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lending decisions,146 and (C) providing credit enhancement in the form of a 
government guarantee.147
A. Creation of a Government-Sponsored Entity 
The driving force behind securitization of home mortgages and other 
types of financial assets has been the efforts of the United States Govern-
ment.148  In creating government-sponsored entities for the purpose of secu-
ritizing home mortgages, Congress single-handedly developed a secondary 
mortgage market.149  At the time Congress created these entities they were 
faced with a potential housing crisis.150  Similarly, small businesses and, in 
particular, minority owned small businesses currently have inadequate ac-
cess to conventional small business loans.151  While other government ef-
forts, such as the many programs existing under the Small Business Ad-
ministration, have attempted to bridge the capital gap that exists, it is clear 
that the solution truly rests in creating an efficient secondary market for 
conventional small business loans.152
146
 Credit scoring could be used to address the problem of non-uniform underwriting standards 
because credit-scoring models are a low-cost method of predicting payment performance of small busi-
ness loans.  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on the Availabil-
ity of Credit to Small Businesses, 59 (September 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/sbc_rep.pdf (hereinafter “Board of Governors”)  
An increasing number of lenders are beginning to use credit-scoring models to underwrite small busi-
ness loans providing an objective assessment of the risks inherent in the loans.  Temkin & Kormendi, 
supra note 44, at 10.  However, these credit scoring models are mostly being used for smaller loans 
meaning that most small business loans are decided by relationship underwriting.  Id.  This results in 
lenders not using a standard set of underwriting guidelines.  Id.  This poses a strong challenge to the 
development of a secondary market for small business loans since secondary markets normally develop 
for assets that have common elements, including relatively common underwriting standards, documenta-
tion, servicing procedures, and collateral.  See id.   
147
 The Small Business Administration or other government agency can provide less expensive 
credit enhancement in order to increase the number of feasible conventional small business loan securi-
tizations.  Id.  Legislation calling for partial guarantees by the SBA of conventional small business loans 
has been introduced in Congress by Senator Olympia Snowe but has remained stalled in committee.  
Small Business Credit Liquidity Act of 2003, S. 1713, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.1713:. 
148
 Cosentino, supra note 6, at 544; Bushaw, supra note 6, at 216. 
149
 With the creation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, and the subsequent securitiza-
tion of residential mortgages, congress created the secondary market for mortgage loans.  Id.
150
 The secondary mortgage market was created as a result of federal government policy to im-
prove the availability of funds for housing finance.  See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1383-84.  
In 1970, Congress passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 which created Freddie Mac and 
augmented the powers of Fannie Mae in response to a near housing crisis.  Id. at 1384. 
151
 See generally Blanchflower, et al., supra note 4. 
152
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 253.  Bushaw provided three potential benefits that government-
sponsored securitization could accomplish, which neither the SBA nor private securitizations have 
accomplished.  Id.  First, government support could increase the willingness of investors to participate in 
small business securitizations.  Id.  Second, government-sponsored securitization could provide a means 
by which small banks could participate in securitization of conventional small business loans.  Id.
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The most effective method of creating an efficient secondary market 
for small business loans is by creating a government-sponsored entity for 
the purpose of purchasing and securitizing small business loans.153
Such an entity will increase investors’ confidence in securities backed 
by conventional small business loans.154  More importantly, such an entity 
would nearly eliminate all the entity risks associated with securitization 
transactions.155  This would ensure that the loans would not be subject to the 
potential insolvency of loan originators.  This entity would be bankruptcy 
remote.156  Investors will see the Government’s participation in these securi-
tizations as an implicit guarantee of the underlying loans.157  The Govern-
ment’s involvement will increase the number of investors willing to invest 
in securities backed by conventional small business loans. 
By structuring the entity as a multiseller securitization conduit, cost 
savings are passed down to firms or originators looking to securitize their 
conventional small business loans.  These cost savings will increase the 
willingness of banks and other lenders to securitize their conventional small 
business loans. 158
Finally, government-sponsored securitization provides credit support that will encourage lenders to 
make loans to businesses that normally cannot obtain a loan.  Id.   
153
 A Government-Sponsored entity for the purpose of securitizing small business loans would 
increase marketplace confidence in small business loan pools, provide small banks with a means to 
securitize their small business loans, and provide credit enhancement to encourage lending to small 
businesses.  Id.  Bushaw refers to this type of government involvement as a subsidy.  Id. at 256. She 
fails to mention that the Government-Sponsored entity would recover the costs they incur in providing 
credit support through fees from the securitization transaction.  Even if it is considered a subsidy, the 
importance of ensuring adequate access to small business loans provides justification for such a subsidy.     
154
 Historically, government involvement in securitization transactions has been necessary in order 
to ensure that investors are satisfied with the securities being issued.  See id. at 253.  “Certainly, there is 
precedent for government-owned or government-sponsored enterprises doing the research, developing a 
program and successfully securitizing assets, only to be followed by private pooling of like assets.”  Id.
Thus, the government’s involvement would lead the way and provide a blueprint or model for private 
securitizations to follow.  Id.
155
 Since a government-sponsored enterprise would be totally independent from the banks and 
other lenders that originate small business loans, it is unlikely that securitization transactions involving 
such an enterprise would carry any risk resulting from the potential insolvency of the originator.   
156
 It is unlikely that a bankruptcy court would recharaterize the transfer of assets as a secured 
loan, that the assets of the originator of the loans and the GSE are substantively consolidated, or that the 
transfer was a fraudulent conveyance since a GSE would be completely independent from the originator.   
157
 Similar to the securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the securities issued by a 
government-sponsored enterprise used for securitizing small business loans will not carry an explicit 
government guarantee.  Bushaw, supra note 6, at 217-18.  Just as securities issued by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are considered to carry an implicit government guarantee, so will securities issued by this 
government-sponsored enterprise.  Id.  This results in increased confidence in the securities being issued 
by the GSE.   
158
 Specifically, these cost savings benefit smaller banks that are normally least likely to partici-
pate in the securitization of small business loans.  Id. at 255.  In addition, these are the banks that would 
normally lend to minorities and other types of businesses that face significant lending obstacles and are 
considered marginal business credits.  See id.  “A GSE could be structured to ensure that small banks are 
able to participate in the securitization of their better small business credits.”  Id.  Bushaw argued that 
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Creation of a government-sponsored entity whose sole purpose is to 
purchase and securitize conventional small business loans is the first step 
towards successful and efficient securitization of conventional small busi-
ness loans.  It is clear that investors will have more confidence in the per-
formance of securities issued by such an entity.  It is also clear that the en-
tity risks associated with securitization transactions are eliminated by such 
an entity.  Finally, the entity will create cost savings for loan originators 
seeking to securitize their loans if it is structured as a multiseller securitiza-
tion conduit. 
B. Adoption of Credit Scoring Models 
In an effective securitization transaction it is important to minimize as-
set risks, or those risks inherent in the underlying assets being securitized.  
The first step in eliminating asset risks is carefully selecting the assets.  
Assets most suitable for securitization are those assets with standardized 
terms, predictable payment patterns, and uniform underwriting and servic-
ing procedures.  For the most part, conventional small business loans do not 
meet any of these requirements.159   Just as was the case with residential 
mortgages before they were successfully securitized, conventional small 
business loans do not possess uniform underwriting and servicing proce-
dures.160  As a result, it is difficult to predict the payment patterns of a pool 
of conventional small business loans.161  The creation of a government-
sponsored enterprise for the purpose of securitization of conventional small 
business loans would make conventional small business loans more suitable 
for securitization.162  As discussed above, the successful securitization of 
residential mortgages by government-sponsored entities resulted in the 
adoption of uniform underwriting and documentation standards across the 
mortgage industry.  Likewise, creation of a government-sponsored enter-
prise will cause the small business loan industry to move in a similar direc-
tion.   
this would impede the progress of private initiatives to pool and securitize loans originated by smaller 
community banks and that those initiatives should be given some time to satisfy the needs of small 
banks before Congress steps in.  Id. Bushaw’s article was written in 1998 and private initiatives have 
had limited success in securitizing small business loans as evidenced by the lack of adequate access to 
capital for small businesses. 
159
 Conventional small business loans are normally heterogeneous, lack standardized loan docu-
mentation, and predicting their payment patterns is not possible.  Board of Governors, supra note 146, at 
36-37. 
160
 Id.
161
 Id.
162
 Just as mortgages became more suitable for securitization as a result of the implementation of 
standardized underwriting and documentation standards when the federal government began securitizing 
them, small business loans will also move towards standardization in order to facilitate their securitiza-
tion.  See Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 28. 
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Currently, a significant portion of conventional small business loans 
are decided using relationship underwriting.163  As a result, conventional 
small business loans vary in their terms and quality on a loan to loan ba-
sis.164  The disparity among conventional small business loans as to their 
quality and terms make it very difficult to predict the aggregate rate of de-
fault on a pool of conventional small business loans.165
By adopting credit scoring models designed to ascertain the likelihood 
of default for a small business, originators of loans will position themselves 
so that they can efficiently securitize the loans they originate.166  Moreover, 
credit scoring models are mostly automated and would result in significant 
cost savings to lenders wishing to securitize their conventional small busi-
ness loans.167  In addition, credit scoring models eliminate much of the vari-
ance in how loan decisions are made.168
Credit scoring models are already in use by many of the larger com-
mercial banks.  Moreover, SBA loans are normally all decided using credit 
scoring models.  The SBA subscribes to services provided by Dunn & 
Bradstreet and Fair, Isaac and Company, which have become leaders in 
developing credit scoring software.   
An added benefit of adopting credit scoring models is that discrimina-
tion in lending markets is diminished since these technologies are auto-
mated and do not factor the race of a lender into the decision of whether to 
approve a loan.  Thus, loans that are decided using credit scoring models 
are decided based on the merits and not the borrower’s race.   
Some scholars argue that credit scoring disadvantages minority busi-
ness owners and other disadvantaged borrowers since they are normally less 
163
 When banks use relationship underwriting, an underwriter makes a decision mostly based on 
information about a firm and its owner that is gained over time through a business relationship.  Id. at 6.  
The business relationship may include loans, deposits and other bank products.  Id. This type of under-
writing allows lenders to look past information such as credit scores and financial statements to deal 
with information problems better than other types of lenders.  Id.  This ability to learn more about the 
firm and its owners allows small banks to continue to dominate small business lending.  Id. at 7. Lend-
ers using relationship underwriting do not adhere to a common set of underwriting standards.  Id. at 6.
The SBA conducted discussions with industry participants and determined that relationship underwriting 
remains prevalent.  Id. at 7.    
164
 The reasoning behind such a variety in the terms and quality of small business loans is that 
small businesses are very diverse.  Id. at 5.  Their heterogeneity in type of business and in their uses of 
borrowed funds does not allow for standardized underwriting resulting in underwriting methods that are 
complex and expensive.  Id.
165
 Since originators do not follow a common set of underwriting standards, a secondary market 
for small business loans becomes difficult to create.  Id. at 7.  The lack of standardization across small 
business loans makes it expensive to analyze loan pools in order to predict their rates of default.  Id.
166
 “Credit scoring is an automated process by which information about an applicant is used to 
generate a numeric score that indicates the predicted future performance . . . of a loan to that applicant.”  
Board of Governors, supra note 146, at 32. 
167
 Credit scoring is a consistent, inexpensive, and fast way of evaluating credit applications.  Id.
168
 Since credit scoring models are automated, they eliminate the variation in how risks are as-
sessed across loan officers.  Id.
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likely to be approved for loans because of their creditworthiness, or lack 
thereof.169  This argument stems from the fact that relationship underwriting 
looks past the borrower’s credit history and bases the decision of whether to 
approve on the nature of the business, the borrower’s banking relationship, 
and any number of other factors.170  Unfortunately, relationship underwrit-
ing has been shown to statistically discriminate against minority business 
owners.
171
By using credit scoring to decide loans, originators are using objective 
methods of making loan decisions and decrease the amount of discrimina-
tion in these decisions.172  In addition, originators using credit scoring mod-
els may begin to originate loans for securitization, making it possible for 
banks to lend to more borrowers since they now have more funds avail-
able.173  This could possibly result in lenders lowering the credit standards 
needed in order to approve a loan since originators are no longer in a posi-
tion where they must bear the credit risk associated with these loans.  This 
would allow disadvantaged borrowers who are currently declined because 
of their lack of creditworthiness to be approved for more loans.174  As long 
as the payment patterns are predictable and ascertainable by actuarial analy-
sis, these loans are prime targets for securitization.175  The goal is to effi-
ciently allocate risk in the hands of the parties that are most suitable for 
bearing these risks.  In this case, investors in securities backed by small 
business loans are better suited to bear credit and liquidity risks associated 
with conventional small business loans than the originators are.  In addition, 
banks and other lending institutions are better suited to originate and ser-
vice loans than investors in securities backed by the loans are. 
A government-sponsored enterprise would require lenders to use uni-
form underwriting standards in order to securitize their conventional small 
business loans.  Adoption of one of several credit scoring models across the 
industry would help facilitate the securitization of conventional small busi-
ness loans by ensuring that loans are decided using uniform underwriting 
standards making it easier to predict future payment patterns.  As a result, 
discrimination against minorities becomes difficult for lenders to fathom 
169
 Id. at 35. 
170
 Temkin & Kormendi, supra note 44, at 6. 
171
 See generally Blanchflower, et al., supra note 4. 
172
 Bushaw, supra note 6, at 249. 
173
 Board of Governors, supra note 146, at 33.  The adoption of credit scoring models provides 
banks with the necessary uniformity in order to originate loans that provide predictable payment patterns 
making them suitable for securitization.  Id.
174
 Board of Governors, supra note 146, at 33.  As funds become available to banks as a result of 
securitization transactions which transfer the credit risk inherent in lending to small businesses to inves-
tors who are better equipped to bear risk, they will now seek to lend more in an effort to securitize.  Id.
175
 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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resulting in better access to small business loans for minority business own-
ers.
C. Government Guarantee of Conventional Small Business Loans 
In minimizing the asset risks involved in a securitization transaction, 
credit enhancement is normally used.  Credit enhancement can be both in-
ternal and external to the assets being securitized.176  An example of internal 
credit enhancement is the overcollateralization of the pool of assets.177  The 
most common form of external credit enhancement is recourse to the origi-
nator of the assets.178  A second type of external credit enhancement is third 
party recourse.179  This type of recourse normally results in no losses to the 
party issuing the guarantee.180
In order to improve the secondary market for conventional small busi-
ness loans, the United States Government, either acting through the SBA or 
on its own, should take a second loss position and guarantee the pools of 
conventional small business loans being securitized.  While this type of 
guarantee is normally reserved for large insurance companies, the guarantee 
of the U.S. Government will be more effective for many reasons.  First, it 
increases confidence in the securities being issued since they are now guar-
anteed by the Government.  Second, it shows investors that the U.S. Gov-
ernment has done an in-depth analysis of the performance to be expected 
from the pool of loans and has put its capital at risk after doing so.181  Third, 
it creates cost savings to the originator of the loan since the amount of re-
course they normally would face is now lessened to the extent of the Gov-
ernment’s guarantee.182  Finally, it eliminates asset risks associated with the 
securitization of conventional small business loans.183
This type of government guarantee has already been proposed in the 
Senate.  On October 3, 2003, Senator Olympia J. Snowe of Maine intro-
176
 Id.
177
 Id.
178
 Id.
179
 Id.
180
 Id.
181
 See Brewer & Iseley, supra note 80, at 129.  Like other credit enhancers, the Government 
would do an in-depth analysis of the assets and their risks and rewards.  Id.  Investors benefit since they 
could now rely on the analysis undertaken by the Government as a credit enhancer.  Id.
182 See Pavel, supra note 78, at 32.  The level of credit enhancement is determined by the risk 
inherent in the assets being securitized.  Id.  If the Government is willing to guarantee portions of the 
pool of loans, the originator would now have a lower level of recourse placed on it and thus, would save 
its capital.  Id.
183
 All forms of credit enhancement are used to eliminate or minimize those risks that are inherent 
in the assets being securitized.  Shenker & Colletta, supra note 6, at 1379.  A guarantee by the Govern-
ment, which benefits from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, could 
potentially eliminate all of the asset risks in a securitization. 
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duced the Small Business Credit Liquidity Act of 2003.184  The Act author-
izes the SBA to provide partial guarantees of pools of conventional small 
business loans in order to facilitate the securitization of the loans through a 
pilot program.185  Under the pilot program that would be established, the 
SBA would cover their exposure to potential losses with the fees they col-
lect from providing the guarantee.186  Senator Snowe emphasized that the 
Act would increase access to capital for small business owners and, in par-
ticular, that such a program would dramatically improve access to capital 
for minority-owned small businesses.187
Unfortunately, Senator Snowe’s proposed legislation has remained 
stalled in committee and has yet to pass.  However, a similar guarantee 
would be essential to successful securitization of conventional small busi-
ness loans.  Such a guarantee would increase confidence in securities 
backed by conventional small business loans, would serve an analytical 
purpose for investors in that the Government would have undertaken an in-
depth analysis of the underlying assets, and would create incentives for 
originators of conventional small business loans to securitize their loans. 
IV.  CONCLUSION
Securitization of conventional small business loans holds the key to 
creating adequate access to capital for minority business owners. To date, 
such securitization has been unsuccessful because of the lack of uniformity 
in conventional small business loans.  Drawing on the experience of the 
secondary mortgage market, it is clear that securitization of conventional 
small business loans could only be effective if the Government becomes 
heavily involved.   
First, the Federal Government should create a government-sponsored 
entity to purchase and securitize conventional small business loans.  This 
entity will result in an implicit guarantee that principal and interest pay-
ments will be made in a timely manner.  More importantly, it would elimi-
184
 Senator Snowe’s floor statement is available at http://sbc.senate.gov/108bills/creditliquiditys-
tat.pdf (hereinafter “Snowe Statement”). 
185
 Olympia J. Snowe, Small Business Credit Liquidity Act Summary of Provisions, available at
http://sbc.senate.gov/108bills/creditliquiditybillprov.pdf.  The pilot program proposed by Senator Snowe 
is a three-year pilot program which facilitates the securitization of small business loans by allowing the 
SBA to guarantee portions of pools of conventional small business loans.  Id.
186
 In her floor statement, Senator Snowe specifically stated, “[T]he cost of the SBA guarantees 
will be fully funded by fees paid by the loan poolers, so no Federal appropriations will be necessary.”  
Snowe Statement, supra note 184, at 3. 
187
 Recognizing that minorities face challenges in securing small business loans, Senator Snowe 
suggested that the opportunities presented by efficient securitization such as lower default risk will 
provide an incentive for lenders to lend to more small businesses.  Id. at 5.  Senator Snowe also empha-
sized that the proposed legislation cannot improve the subjective lending behavior which results in 
discrimination and poor access to credit for small business loans, but that by providing lenders with 
incentives to lend to all business owners, minorities benefit proportionately.  Id.
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nate the entity risks that are associated with the securitization of conven-
tional small business loans.  As a result of those efforts, the lending industry 
will adopt credit scoring models when originating conventional small busi-
ness loans.  This will create uniformity across the industry making securi-
ties backed by these loans more attractive to rating agencies and investors.  
Finally, the U.S. Government should take a second loss position in the secu-
ritization of conventional small business loans and guarantee the pools of 
loans being securitized.  This would eliminate many of the asset risks asso-
ciated with securitization of conventional small business loans. 
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